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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted Patrick Oar of the crimes of conspiracy to commit grand theft by
extortion, and grand theft by extortion. Mr. Oar asserts that there was insufficient evidence to
support his grand theft by extortion conviction1 because his actions did not “compel,” “induce,”
or “cause” the victim to deliver money; rather, the victim delivered the money at the direction of
a police detective. Additionally, Mr. Oar asserts that his sentence is excessive in light of the
mitigating factors that exist in his case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
M.D. was a methamphetamine dealer who worked her way up through a drug trafficking
ring to the point that she was fronted thousands of dollars worth of methamphetamine, with the
promise that she would pay her supplier back after she sold it. (Tr., p.704, L.22 – p.713, L.12.)2
In January of 2014, Detective Coy Bruner and other narcotics detectives arrested M.D. for her
role in the drug trafficking ring; however, they held back filing the charges because she agreed to
work with them as a confidential informant. (Tr., p.325, L.4 – p.328, L.2; p.342, L.5 – p.359,
L.11.) With M.D.’s assistance, officers arrested Celio Ponce-Alba, who was known to M.D. as
Omar (hereinafter Omar), after M.D. participated in a controlled buy where she gave Omar
$6,000.00 in marked bills for methamphetamine he had previously supplied her. (Tr., p.351, L.6
– p.369, L.4.) Omar was held in the Ada County jail where he was housed in a four-person cell;

1

Mr. Oar does not challenge his conviction for conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion in
this appeal.
2
All citations to the transcripts in this brief will be to the 1220-page volume created for the bulk
of the proceedings.
1

Patrick Oar was arrested on a parole violation a month and one-half later and was housed in the
same cell as Omar. (Tr., p.237, L.2 – p.243, L.10; PSI, p.4.)3
Prior to his arrest, Mr. Oar had worked for local attorneys, including Dennis Sallaz, doing
a variety of tasks including tracking down collateral and making collections. (Tr., p.830, L.6 –
p.833, L.22; PSI, p.4.) Mr. Oar agreed to help Omar collect some debt that he was owed so that
Omar could pay Mr. Sallaz a retainer. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Oar recruited Katie Blake, a woman who
he knew from her work at Mr. Sallaz’s law office, to help him collect some of that money.
(Tr., p.380, L.8 – p.406, L.3; p.441, L.20 – p.446, L.10; p.882, L.2 – p.904, L.5; Exs. 8, 14-26.)
Using the name “Pracilla,” Ms. Blake contacted M.D. at the Howard Johnson Hotel
where M.D. worked the overnight shift, said that she was a friend of Omar’s and was trying to
collect the $4,000.00 M.D. still owed him, and she gave M.D. a note written by Omar which
included various payment options: M.D. agreed to pay the full amount but said she needed a few
days to get the money together. (Tr., p.718, L.21 – p.727, L.18.) The next morning, M.D.
contacted Detective Bruner and, at his direction and with his assistance, M.D. delivered
$2,000.00 to Ms. Blake a few days later, while the transaction was being monitored and audio
recorded by narcotics detectives. (Tr., p.727, L.21 – p.735, L.5.)
An Ada County grand jury issued an Indictment charging Mr. Oar in Count I with
conspiracy to commit grand theft by extortion, naming Ms. Blake as his co-conspirator, and in
Count II Mr. Oar was charged with committing grand theft by extortion. (R., pp.9-12.) A few
weeks later, an Information Part II was filed alleging that Mr. Oar was a persistent violator.
(R., pp.29-30.) Ms. Blake was similarly charged (although not alleged to be a persistent violator)

3

Citations to the Presentence Investigation report and its attachments will include the page
number associated with the electronic file containing those documents.
2

and the two were tried together. (R., pp.13-15, 155-166, 168-184, 186-193.) A jury found
Mr. Oar guilty of both charges and he admitted to being a persistent violator.4 (R., p.241;
Tr., p.1174, Ls.1-4, p.175, L.2 – p.1176, L.24.)
The State asked the court to impose concurrent unified terms of 20 years, with five years
fixed (Tr., p.1203, Ls.4-12), while Mr. Oar’s counsel requested that the Court impose a one-year
fixed term, with an indeterminate term to run consecutively the term he was serving as a result of
his parole violation (Tr., p.1213, Ls.6-15). On each count, the district court imposed concurrent
unified terms of 17 years, with five years fixed, to run consecutive to the sentence Mr. Oar was
required to serve as a result of his parole violation. (R., pp.1245-1249; Tr., p.1218, L.18 –
p.1219, L.5.) Mr. Oar filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.1251-1254.)

4

The jury found Ms. Blake guilty of conspiring with Mr. Oar to commit grand theft by extortion
but could not reach a verdict on the count alleging that she actually committed grand theft by
extortion. (Tr., p.1174, Ls.5-9.)
3

ISSUE
1.

Should this Court vacate Mr. Oar’s conviction for grand theft by extortion as there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in light of
the mitigating factors that exist in this case?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Must Vacate Mr. Oar’s Conviction For Grand Theft By Extortion As There Was
Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction
A.

Introduction
Under Idaho law, grand theft by extortion is committed when a person “compels or

induced another to deliver such property to himself or to a third person … .” I.C. §§ 182403(2)(e); 18-2407(1)(a). Although the elements instruction provided in this case did not use
precisely the same language, the jury was instructed that, in order for Mr. Oar to be found guilty,
they must find that he “along with Kathryn Blake, caused M.D. to deliver to Kathryn Blake US
Currency.” (R., p.216.) Although there was evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Oar and
Ms. Blake attempted to cause M.D. to deliver money to Ms. Blake, the undisputed evidence in
this case demonstrates conclusively that it was Detective Bruner who compelled, induced, or
caused M.D. to deliver the money. As such, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict finding Mr. Oar guilty of grand theft by extortion.
B.

A Conviction Founded Upon Insufficient Evidence Violates A Defendant’s Right To Due
Process Of Law And Must Be Vacated
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State of Idaho

from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const.
Amd. XIV. “Just as ‘Conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,’
so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt.”
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional citations omitted).) “It is axiomatic that a conviction upon

5

a charge not made or upon a charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process.” Jackson v.
Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (citations omitted).
The question of whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain a conviction can be
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995). An appellate
Court “will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution
proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Severson, 147
Idaho 694, 712 (2009) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)).
When determining whether sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction was presented, an
appellate court will not make determinations on the credibility of witnesses or how much weight
should be given to each piece of evidence, and will view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the State. Id. (citations omitted).
C.

Compelling Or Inducing A Person To Turn Over Property Is A Necessary Element Of
Grand Theft By Extortion Under Idaho Law
The Idaho legislature has instructed Idaho Courts on how the statutes it passes should be

interpreted:
(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the
legislature shall be given effect without engaging in statutory construction. The
literal words of a statute are the best guide to determining legislative intent.
(2) If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the statute
must be construed as a whole. Interpretations which would render the statute a
nullity, or which would lead to absurd results, are disfavored.
(3) Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved
usage of the language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are defined in the
6

succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate
meaning or definition.
I.C. § 73-113; see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892893 (2011). Idaho Code § 18-2403(2)(e) reads in relevant part as follows:
(2) Theft includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's
property, with the intent prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, committed in
any of the following ways:
(e) By extortion. A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or
induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third
person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered,
the actor or another will:
1. Cause physical injury to some person in the future …
I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e) (emphasis added). By its plain language, where someone threatens another
with future physical injury in they don’t deliver the demanded property, unless that threat
actually compels or induces the threatened person to deliver the property, the person making the
threat has not violated this statute.5
Although there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar (with
the assistance of Ms. Blake) threatened M.D. with future violence if she did not deliver money, it
is undisputed that the threat did not compel or induce (I.C. § 18-2403(2)(e)) nor cause (J.I. 17
(R., p.216)) M.D. to deliver the money to Ms. Blake. Both M.D. and Detective Bruner testified
that M.D. delivered the $2,000.00 in recorded bills to Ms. Blake at Detective Bruner’s direction.
(Tr., p.432, L.6 – p.440, L.21; p.465, L.5 – p.473, L.17; p.730, L.3 – p.732, L.17.) Put another

5

That is not to say that a person making such a threat is free of potential criminal liability. An
attempt to compel another to deliver property by use of a threat of future physical violence
constitutes attempted grand theft by extortion. See I.C. § 18-306; see also State v. Reinoehl, 70
Idaho 361 (1949) (holding that, under the then-existing statutory scheme, attempted extortion
occurs where a victim delivers property to another based upon a motivation other than the threat
made by the defendant).
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way, Detective Bruner compelled, induced, or caused M.D. to deliver the money to Ms. Blake,
not Mr. Oar. As such, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Mr. Oar
was guilty of grand theft by extortion, and this Court must vacate that conviction.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of The
Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Mr. Oar asserts that, given any view of the facts, his total unified sentence of 17 years,
with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Oar does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Oar must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,
121 Idaho 385 (1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138
(2001)).

8

Mr. Oar admitted that he knew that he was trying to assist Omar in collecting a drug debt
from M.D. and he recognized that he made a “terrible – terrible decision” in doing so. (PSI, p.4.)
He also took full responsibility expressing that he felt “‘very, very bad that Kathryn Blake has to
deal with this’”, and that “‘she was doing what I asked her to do.’” (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Oar
continued,
“I have made a huge mistake, my actions not only resulted in the charges, but
have also caused stress, pain and suffering for those involved. I take full
responsibility for my actions and the pain it has caused. I hope the court will
consider in my sentencing – that I have been a law-abiding citizen with no
felonies for a long period of time, now over 21 years. I know this situation nor
anything like it will ever recur by me again. I have in fact done over 15 years of
intense close-custody parole supervision, and now I hope the court can see fit to
put me back on parole as quickly as possible, or as it seems appropriate.”
(PSI, pp.11-12.) Finally, during the sentencing hearing, Mr. Oar again took responsibilities for
his action, stating that he did not intend to scare M.D. and that he was sorry that Ms. Blake got
caught up in it, and he apologized to the court. (Tr., p.1215, Ls.1-9.)
In addition to taking responsibility for his actions, Mr. Oar enjoys the support of family
and community members.

His half-brother Thomas Dishion, his aunt Elizabeth Cada, his

cousins Fran Hardy and Dan Cada, former co-worker Thomas Henry, and attorneys Jacob
Deaton, Ivar Longeteig, and Dennis Sallaz, all wrote letters in support of Mr. Oar. (PSI, pp.8491, 381.) These letters generally describe Mr. Oar as a reliable, caring, and hard-working
person. Id.
Idaho Courts recognize that remorse and acceptance of responsibility, as well as support
from family members and friends, are mitigating factors that should be considered by the district
court when determining an appropriate sentence. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982); see also State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). In light of the mitigating
factors that are present in this case, Mr. Oar asserts that the district court imposed an excessive

9

sentence. As requested by his trial counsel, Mr. Oar asserts that a one-year fixed term with an
appropriate indeterminate terms, to run consecutively to his previously imposed sentence, would
appropriately address all of the relevant sentencing considerations.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Oar respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for grand theft by
extortion, and to remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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